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== Discussion ==
12:02:31 Roman: One question before we start:
Is there any reasoning involved considering if applying some set of logical and math objects for ontology construction correct, given that their own ontology status is unclear. How can this pre-ontology of logico-mathematical objects be justificated as to serve as the basis for the primary ontology construction?
 
12:02:42 Ravi Sharma: would be nice if truthmakers are well defined.
 
12:05:59 Ravi Sharma: Is truthmaker the enabler of reality in theory?
 
12:08:54 Roman: What conditions guarantee the above mentioned relevance?
 
12:24:51 Ravi Sharma: how do you handle uncertainties in this case?
 
12:28:04 Ravi Sharma: Is fusion like a new state with weights of each?
 
12:32:36 Ravi Sharma: what is the relation between truthmakers and hyperintensional revolution?
 
12:35:23 Phil Jackson: potential relevance to real world ontologies?
 
12:37:19 Mike Bennett: As a simple engineer, I look at the use of the notion of there being truth makers as a way to firmly characterize what is an ontology of concepts in the domain of discourse as distinct from ontologies of data pretending to be the things. i.e. what it means to be this thing. Interested how this thinking relates to that.
* 12:37:41 Jim Logan [Ontogenesis]: 👍🏻
* 12:38:51 janet singer: 👍🏻
* 12:51:25 Maybe the issue is that ‘capabilities’ and ‘doing things’ are matters for pragmatics. Maybe TMS as a more refined treatment of the semantics and sets up possibility for cleaner treatment of the pragmatics?
* 12:58:45 janet singer: Iow, the issue with Johnny is a violation of conversational conventions, like somebody responding to ‘is there salt on the table?’ with ‘yes’
* 13:05:27 Phil Jackson: hmm.. yet TMS doesn't seem to represent actions, like 'passing the salt'...
* 13:06:41 janet singer: Yes, my point was that the semantics can’t be made to do the job of pragmatics
* 13:08:44 janet singer: TMS being cleaner seems better suited to distinguishing semantics from pragmatics
 
12:37:25 Alexandre Declos: You said that the truthmaker for ‘p and q’ is the fusion of the truthmaker for ‘p’ and the truthmaker for ‘q’. But why is that fusion more relevant than the usual truthmaker for ‘p and q’ in classical logic?
 
12:38:06 Boyan Brodaric: connection of falsity-makers to impossible states?
 
12:42:05 Ravi Sharma: why does the act of speaking remove the notion?
 
12:44:55 Jonas Amar: I’m curious about the applications of truthmaker semantics. Do you think for instance that it could apply to the metaphysics of modality ?
 
12:45:22 João Paulo A. Almeida: Excellent point… computer scientists are usually only focused on (or obsessed with) formal semantics, not with real-world semantics
* 12:47:37 Mike Bennett: 👍
 
12:47:27 Ítalo Oliveira: Any facts about the computational properties of the Truthmaker semantics?
 
12:47:38 Gary Berg-Cross: What do you consider good examples of invariants "out there" in the real world that we might use as a starter set for a real world based ontology?
 
12:47:40 João Paulo A. Almeida: Kit, maybe you could comment on how TMS can help us in understanding modal operators (alethic and deontic). (The possible world semantics for deontic operators has quite vexing problems as you’ve discussed with the example involving Johnny.)
 
12:48:08 Ravi Sharma: you are saying internal semantics vocabulary and that is acceptable, but how then do you relate it to external real world?
 
12:50:18 João Paulo A. Almeida: Yes, I know that paper ;-)
 
12:50:42 João Paulo A. Almeida: I have been waiting for it
 
12:54:10 Mike Raven: You distinguish truthmaker semantics (TMS) from truthmaker metaphysics. TMS allows states to be anything that conforms to the structures imposed on a statespace. Do you expect these structures will seamlessly transpose to truthmakers (states of affairs) in metaphysics? If not, does this unduly limit TMS's application to metaphysics?
 
12:57:54 João Paulo A. Almeida: Thanks a lot. How about alethic operators?
 
13:08:34 Roman: It would be wise to first understand what 'correspondence' is before demanding it. This is the primary complication. Even if we assume we understand it, all we can say is the practically tautological proposition: «Yes, for a correspondence judgment to be true, correspondence must hold in the world.»
 
13:11:53 João Paulo A. Almeida: I think I remember reading you require some property like “perspicuity in expression” for TMS
 
13:13:18 Alican Tuezuen: If i understood him correctly, he is saying if you descriebe how semantics work, how do you justify that it is the way it works?
 
13:15:26 Gary Berg-Cross: Can we ask for a meaning of "colorless green ideas?"
* 13:20:45 Mike Bennett: 😂
 
13:19:16 João Paulo A. Almeida: It’s very important because we are constructing those state spaces (it’s the business of Applied Ontology)
 
13:20:01 João Paulo A. Almeida: (We are never looking only at worlds as opaque “points”… we are always after the structure of worlds.)
 
13:24:23 Gary Berg-Cross: Is bachelor an example of a blob that we can think of as having more structure in human minds?
 
13:26:35 Gary Berg-Cross: If we use the 3 parts of the triangle of meaning model does the meaning of truthmakers apply just to the relations of statements and reality and not to human conceptualization?
 
13:27:52 Roman: Okay, let’s consider the following:
* We have proposition p to be evaluated
* We have some hypothetical truth-maker for p - TM(p)
* Our semantics sounds like:
** P is true iff  TM(p) is true. SO : True(p) <=> True(TM(p))
** But this means in fact simply a latent tautology of the following form: True(p) <=> «TM(p) is the truth-maker for p» <=> (when TM(p) is truly the p’s true-maker?? Just when p is true)
** SO our semantics finally yields: True(p) <=> True(p)
 
13:29:53 Alican Tuezuen: Thank you, it was a great talk!
 
13:29:57 João Paulo A. Almeida: Excellent
 
13:30:04 Phil Jackson: Thanks!
 
13:30:05 janet singer: Excellent


== Resources ==
== Resources ==

Revision as of 16:56, 13 March 2025

Session Track 2
Duration 1 hour
Date/Time 12 Mar 2025 16:00 GMT
9:00am PDT/12:00pm EDT
4:00pm GMT/5:00pm CST
Convener Alex Shkotin

Ontology Summit 2025 Track 2

Agenda

Kit Fine on Truthmaker Semantics


Conference Call Information

12:02:31 Roman: One question before we start: Is there any reasoning involved considering if applying some set of logical and math objects for ontology construction correct, given that their own ontology status is unclear. How can this pre-ontology of logico-mathematical objects be justificated as to serve as the basis for the primary ontology construction?

12:02:42 Ravi Sharma: would be nice if truthmakers are well defined.

12:05:59 Ravi Sharma: Is truthmaker the enabler of reality in theory?

12:08:54 Roman: What conditions guarantee the above mentioned relevance?

12:24:51 Ravi Sharma: how do you handle uncertainties in this case?

12:28:04 Ravi Sharma: Is fusion like a new state with weights of each?

12:32:36 Ravi Sharma: what is the relation between truthmakers and hyperintensional revolution?

12:35:23 Phil Jackson: potential relevance to real world ontologies?

12:37:19 Mike Bennett: As a simple engineer, I look at the use of the notion of there being truth makers as a way to firmly characterize what is an ontology of concepts in the domain of discourse as distinct from ontologies of data pretending to be the things. i.e. what it means to be this thing. Interested how this thinking relates to that.

  • 12:37:41 Jim Logan [Ontogenesis]: 👍🏻
  • 12:38:51 janet singer: 👍🏻
  • 12:51:25 Maybe the issue is that ‘capabilities’ and ‘doing things’ are matters for pragmatics. Maybe TMS as a more refined treatment of the semantics and sets up possibility for cleaner treatment of the pragmatics?
  • 12:58:45 janet singer: Iow, the issue with Johnny is a violation of conversational conventions, like somebody responding to ‘is there salt on the table?’ with ‘yes’
  • 13:05:27 Phil Jackson: hmm.. yet TMS doesn't seem to represent actions, like 'passing the salt'...
  • 13:06:41 janet singer: Yes, my point was that the semantics can’t be made to do the job of pragmatics
  • 13:08:44 janet singer: TMS being cleaner seems better suited to distinguishing semantics from pragmatics

12:37:25 Alexandre Declos: You said that the truthmaker for ‘p and q’ is the fusion of the truthmaker for ‘p’ and the truthmaker for ‘q’. But why is that fusion more relevant than the usual truthmaker for ‘p and q’ in classical logic?

12:38:06 Boyan Brodaric: connection of falsity-makers to impossible states?

12:42:05 Ravi Sharma: why does the act of speaking remove the notion?

12:44:55 Jonas Amar: I’m curious about the applications of truthmaker semantics. Do you think for instance that it could apply to the metaphysics of modality ?

12:45:22 João Paulo A. Almeida: Excellent point… computer scientists are usually only focused on (or obsessed with) formal semantics, not with real-world semantics

  • 12:47:37 Mike Bennett: 👍

12:47:27 Ítalo Oliveira: Any facts about the computational properties of the Truthmaker semantics?

12:47:38 Gary Berg-Cross: What do you consider good examples of invariants "out there" in the real world that we might use as a starter set for a real world based ontology?

12:47:40 João Paulo A. Almeida: Kit, maybe you could comment on how TMS can help us in understanding modal operators (alethic and deontic). (The possible world semantics for deontic operators has quite vexing problems as you’ve discussed with the example involving Johnny.)

12:48:08 Ravi Sharma: you are saying internal semantics vocabulary and that is acceptable, but how then do you relate it to external real world?

12:50:18 João Paulo A. Almeida: Yes, I know that paper ;-)

12:50:42 João Paulo A. Almeida: I have been waiting for it

12:54:10 Mike Raven: You distinguish truthmaker semantics (TMS) from truthmaker metaphysics. TMS allows states to be anything that conforms to the structures imposed on a statespace. Do you expect these structures will seamlessly transpose to truthmakers (states of affairs) in metaphysics? If not, does this unduly limit TMS's application to metaphysics?

12:57:54 João Paulo A. Almeida: Thanks a lot. How about alethic operators?

13:08:34 Roman: It would be wise to first understand what 'correspondence' is before demanding it. This is the primary complication. Even if we assume we understand it, all we can say is the practically tautological proposition: «Yes, for a correspondence judgment to be true, correspondence must hold in the world.»

13:11:53 João Paulo A. Almeida: I think I remember reading you require some property like “perspicuity in expression” for TMS

13:13:18 Alican Tuezuen: If i understood him correctly, he is saying if you descriebe how semantics work, how do you justify that it is the way it works?

13:15:26 Gary Berg-Cross: Can we ask for a meaning of "colorless green ideas?"

  • 13:20:45 Mike Bennett: 😂

13:19:16 João Paulo A. Almeida: It’s very important because we are constructing those state spaces (it’s the business of Applied Ontology)

13:20:01 João Paulo A. Almeida: (We are never looking only at worlds as opaque “points”… we are always after the structure of worlds.)

13:24:23 Gary Berg-Cross: Is bachelor an example of a blob that we can think of as having more structure in human minds?

13:26:35 Gary Berg-Cross: If we use the 3 parts of the triangle of meaning model does the meaning of truthmakers apply just to the relations of statements and reality and not to human conceptualization?

13:27:52 Roman: Okay, let’s consider the following:

  • We have proposition p to be evaluated
  • We have some hypothetical truth-maker for p - TM(p)
  • Our semantics sounds like:
    • P is true iff TM(p) is true. SO : True(p) <=> True(TM(p))
    • But this means in fact simply a latent tautology of the following form: True(p) <=> «TM(p) is the truth-maker for p» <=> (when TM(p) is truly the p’s true-maker?? Just when p is true)
    • SO our semantics finally yields: True(p) <=> True(p)

13:29:53 Alican Tuezuen: Thank you, it was a great talk!

13:29:57 João Paulo A. Almeida: Excellent

13:30:04 Phil Jackson: Thanks!

13:30:05 janet singer: Excellent

Resources

Previous Meetings

 Session
ConferenceCall 2025 03 05Track 2
ConferenceCall 2025 02 26Track 2
ConferenceCall 2025 02 19Track 1
... further results

Next Meetings

 Session
ConferenceCall 2025 03 19Synthesis
ConferenceCall 2025 03 26Track 3
ConferenceCall 2025 04 02Track 3
... further results
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